China and Taiwan: Beware the law of unintended consequences
By Thomas Talley
Real Clear Wire
There is a lot of writing about a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. That body of writing tends to fall into one of two camps: 1) discussing the possibility of a Chinese invasion and, 2) thinking through the tactical and operational considerations about the campaign. Here is my two cents worth: these are the wrong conversations because they distract from the real conversation that needs to happen. That conversation is about ‘what comes next.’
Will China invade Taiwan? Yes. As long as Xi Jinping is the supreme power in China, as he currently is, count on it. Why? He has repeatedly told everyone who is listening that he intends to do so. He has the authority and the will to do it. He has built up China’s military to the point where they have the capability to do it, right now. For Xi, an invasion is not just desirable, it is also necessary. Necessary to fulfill the vision of China that he has sold to his people: to protect the historical inviolability of China, to realize the destiny of a resurgent China and, by putting the West in its place, to deliver retribution for the Century of Humiliation. That vision is what Xi is speaking of when he says, “The East is rising, and the West is declining.” It is also necessary for him to realize his own ambition, his vision for his place in Chinese history. Which explains why the invasion will happen a lot sooner than people expect: Xi doesn’t just want to be the great man in Chinese history, he wants to live long enough to enjoy that place in history.
Yes, there are a litany of reasons that have been given for why China will not, or should not, invade Taiwan. Ignore them. If they don’t figure into Xi’s calculations, and they don’t, then they shouldn’t figure into yours. All you’ll do is deceive yourself. The window of opportunity for China to invade is wide open. All that remains is for Xi to give the command.
It’s worth noting that there has never been an amphibious assault in the modern era that has failed to gain the beach, for the very good reason that the undertaking requires the mobilized might of an industrialized nation. Best to assume that China will indeed gain the beaches.
But that will be as far as China goes.
Then, in rapid sequence, the PLA will fail, the PRC will fracture, and the CCP will collapse. Why?
Because the PLA will not be able to expand out of the beachhead, thus dooming the invasion, and the US will impose a blockade, severing China from global markets and global finance. Imagine the effect on Chinese citizens seeing their vaunted military, heroes of a hundred parades, stranded, isolated, and besieged, on the shores of Taiwan. That’s bad. The effects of a blockade are worse. Like COVID, panicked citizens will hoard food and money, and microeconomic activity will all but cease. Unlike COVID, China will no longer have access to global trade and global finance. Production of goods and services will stall and then collapse. Unemployment will skyrocket. No jobs, no money, no food. That description will apply to hundreds of millions of Chinese, everywhere, all at once. Urban populations will flee to rural areas, in search of food. But China cannot feed itself. It even has to import fertilizers. No region of China will be spared extreme stress.
Why will the invasion fail? Because the one thing that is harder than gaining the beaches in an amphibious operation is expanding beyond the beachhead. Salerno, Normandy, Peleliu; these battles all attest to the difficulty. Those operations were conducted by battle-hardened, professional militaries who enjoyed complete control over the seas and air, were continually reinforced by an uninterrupted supply line, and were directed by headquarters already experienced in commanding complex operations against a determined foe. Not a single one of those characteristics define the PLA or the situation in Taiwan. To suggest that China will be able to expand out of the beachhead is to assume that everything that must go right for them, will; and everything that must go wrong for Taiwan, will. That’s beyond probable; it’s impossible. The PLA will be revealed to be less than the sum of its parts. It may look like a modern military, but the reality is that it is the armed wing of a political party, bereft of actual combat experience, unversed in conducting, coordinating, and sustaining complex joint operations. Its culture discourages subordinates taking initiative, leaders assuming risk, and anyone critiquing any political decision. The PLA is a product of the CCP’s political culture; it lacks a military culture.
Why will the US initiate a blockade? Because it must. Failing to do so would amount to surrendering leadership of the world to a resurgent, aggressive, domineering China. It is the fastest, cheapest, surest means of achieving an immediate effect. And it is also the easiest to de-escalate from (an important consideration: always best to avoid kinetic exchanges between nuclear powers, right?). A blockade demonstrates the US’ dominant position and brings pressure to bear on China’s critical vulnerability: it is utterly dependent upon global trade and global finance. It can be initiated hundreds (thousands) of miles away from China, beyond China’s ability to effectively respond; and it poses the least risk to US naval forces.
Long before the economic impact is felt, the psychological impact on Chinese population and social stability will be devastating. Contrary to appearances, China is not a monolith, and it abounds with social, economic, and political fissures and stress points. The cascading crises will trigger a political crisis, and Xi’s regime will cease to exist. It won’t go quietly, but it will go, nonetheless.
But as Xi goes, so goes the CCP. This is because Xi has introduced a fatal, structural weakness into the CCP at its highest echelon, the Politburo Supreme Committee (PSC). Stability and succession were the primary roles of the Politburo Standing Committee, ensuring the continued rule of the Party. Previously, the main factions of the CCP had representatives on the PSC. This ensured that the Party leadership would have support from all the factions.
That is no longer the case. Xi himself was not aligned with a faction; he was a compromise candidate. As he owes no loyalty to any faction, all factions are a threat to him. He neutralized that threat through his anti-corruption campaigns. Over two million members of the CCP were imprisoned, executed, or banished from the Party. Xi has earned a lot of powerful enemies. He has also filled the PSC with his closest cronies; none of whom have an independent base of support. Without Xi, they are nothing.
As a result, there is no governing body in the CCP with both the authority and the perceived legitimacy to appoint a new ruler. Nature abhors a vacuum and powerful, ambitious, aggrieved men will seize the moment, drawing upon regional and factional bases of support. Without a Standing Committee to manage a peaceful transition, what are the odds that all, most, or any of these contenders will peacefully gather together in a room and work out a power-sharing plan that ensures the continued existence and rule of the CCP? I doubt it will happen. Xi’s anti-faction campaign didn’t just imprison threats to his regime, it destroyed trust amongst the Party members. The irony is profound: in an effort to ensure his own rule, Xi has destroyed the CCP’s ability to survive him. It is entirely accurate to say that ‘China is one heartbeat away from disaster.’
What will that disaster look like? Chinese history is clear and consistent: China will fracture and collapse into an interregnum: a prolonged, chaotic, violent, and unstable period of time. The Shun Dynasty and the Warlord Era prove this point. Both existed during the last two interregnums, following the demise of the Ming and the Qing dynasties, respectively. Neither survived. Eventually, a new regime will emerge and piece China back together again.
What to make of this? I am unable and unwilling to indulge in wishful thinking or offer any false hope. Driven by Xi’s ambitions, and fueled by an aggressive, aggrieved Chinese nationalism that is convinced of its destiny, willing to assert itself, and eager to deliver retribution upon its enemies, there is now very little chance of a rational actor wisely and deftly pulling China, and the world, back from the edge of the cliff. War in Taiwan is coming. Soon. But whatever happens in Taiwan, or to Taiwan, is far less significant and important that what will transpire in China.
If you’re prescient and prudent, you are already pricing in an invasion of Taiwan. If not, begin now. But don’t stop there. Because if China does invade, I advise you to also price in the likelihood of a Second Warlord Era, and plan accordingly.
Thomas Talley is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel, who served the final years of his career as a Strategic Plans Officer. A graduate of the Virginia Military Institute, Mr. Talley received a master’s degree in international relations from Troy University and a master’s degree in military arts and sciences from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. As a professional soldier, a student of international affairs, and a concerned American, Mr. Talley has spent many years reading about and coming to understand China as the pacing threat it is, long before the U.S. establishment (finally) publicly acknowledged it as such. Mr. Talley has previously been published in Small Wars Journal and IO Sphere, the professional journal of Joint Information Operations.
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