Why the Strait of Hormuz may be a feature, not a flaw

By Richard Porter 
Real Clear Wire

Is what initially looked like a flaw in the U.S. Iran war plan instead a useful feature? 

Iran’s most effective countermeasure against the high-tech U.S.-Israeli assault on the Islamic Republic has been its relatively low-tech closing of the Strait of Hormuz – or so it seemed.  About 20% of the oil consumed globally passes through the Strait; 21 million barrels a day has been passing through this choke point in recent years. This means that shutting the Strait gives Iran leverage to fight off the U.S. and Israel, right?

Indeed, Iran’s decision (or was it merely a reflex – is there any leader left to make strategic decisions?) to close the Strait has been described as a setback for, and a blunder by, the Trump administration.

It has swiftly become conventional wisdom that this risk was overlooked, that allowing the Strait to close is a failure – how did the U.S. and Israel overlook such an obvious risk? Why did they wait 10 days to sink Iran’s mine-laying boats? 

But consider this: While the entire industrial world is impacted by Iran’s closing of the Strait, Iran’s erstwhile ally China suffers the greatest direct impact; 45-50% of China’s crude oil imports come through the Strait. While Iran is giving passage to some ships bearing oil for China, the flow of oil to China through the Strait is down about 75%, and China is jacking up its domestic regulated gasoline prices in response.

Could it be that Trump administration planners figured that Iran would not cut off its own ally – and if it did, then it would effectively be signaling to China that its oil supply chain is protected by and vulnerable to the U.S. military, thereby enhancing Trump’s leverage in his ongoing negotiations with China’s President Xi Jinping? If Trump decides to seize Iran’s oil facilities on Kharg Island to squeeze what’s left of Iran’s leadership, the squeeze will be felt in Beijing, too.

Note that Trump asked China to help open the Strait – essentially inviting China to enter the war against its nominal ally, driving the point home: Between the Persian Gulf and Venezuela, China now gets half of its oil imports by the grace of the United States.

With that perspective, one can see why the U.S. plan focused on other priorities before securing the Strait: The Islamic Republic had powerful incentives to leave it open. But if Iran closed the Strait to hurt the U.S., Iran would also inadvertently advance Washington’s strategic goal of building leverage over China. U.S. planners were also probably comfortable that, so long as our other objectives in the war are achieved first, the U.S. would be able to reopen the Strait, albeit at the cost of a short-term indirect hit to the American economy from higher gas prices and further military action.

Trump is at work eliminating international bad actors while ramping up pressure on China.  

A year ago, China seemed to have significant advantages over the U.S. China had a chokehold on rare earth minerals and threatened the West’s vital supply of semiconductor chips from Taiwan. As China increased its Taiwan threats, our economic leverage did not appear compelling, and our military deterrence seemed uncertain and perhaps no longer credible.

A year later, Trump has either eliminated or side-lined three of China’s allies – Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran; seized control over China’s supply chain for oil to counter their control of rare earths, and demonstrated the breathtaking skill of our military (at the cost of depleting our store of arms, which will take some time to refresh, and a relatively small, short-term inflationary hit).

But what of Europe? 

Europe’s economy is hit by higher oil prices too, but the direct impact from the Strait closing is less significant: 6% of the crude and 9% of the natural gas consumed in the EU transits the Strait.  On the other hand, 16% of the petroleum and 45% of the natural gas consumed in the EU comes from the U.S., now at higher market prices due to the closing of the Strait, at least for the time being.

So Trump asks our historical and now increasingly nominal European allies, mostly run by left-wing governments that rely to some extent on Islamic voters for power, to join us in keeping the Strait open.

After saying initially that they would not assist the U.S. in protecting shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, on Thursday Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan issued a joint statement that they are prepared to support “appropriate measures” to protect shipping in the Strait and welcomed “preparatory planning” for the effort. What that means isn’t yet clear, but it’s a step towards supporting the U.S., despite their hurt feelings for being left out of planning as well as their disquiet about the mission.  

Nor is it clear that the current governments of Britain, France, and Germany can actually enter a fight against Islamic extremism alongside the U.S. in light of the makeup and beliefs of their constituencies. Islamic voters are now a key constituency of at least the Labour Party in Britain, if not the left more generally in Europe; European left-wing governments need voters sympathetic to the Palestinians and the Islamic Republic and who hate Israel to remain in power.

So, the truth is that the Europeans are unlikely to really help the U.S. clear the Strait. They will let us do the dirty work of making sure the oil the world needs keeps flowing, revealing political, military, and economic weakness to the world and to their own domestic political audiences.

While the course of future events remains uncertain and risky, this much is clear: Trump is changing foreign policy, challenging China, and putting pressure on European political coalitions that are hostile to him and to the U.S. with stunning boldness.

This could well be a foreign policy success in the making – and the only failure to date is that of Trump’s critics to see what he’s accomplished so far.

Richard Porter is a member of the Board of Directors of the Alfa Institute, a platform for ideas, policy proposals and new technology integration pertaining to artificial intelligence.