State: Court did not abuse its discretion, Coonrod appeal does not merit third trial
Lead Summary
By
Brandy Chandler-brandychandler@gmail.com
The Highland County Prosecutor's Office filed a brief with Ohio's Fourth District Court of Appeals on Monday stating that Wesley Coonrod does not deserve a third trial because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror during deliberations and seated an alternate.
In August, Coonrod's attorney, Eric Allen, filed an appeal of his convictions of involuntary manslaughter, saying that the trial court erred in its dismissal of a "holdout" juror "without just cause" and requested that the court of appeals grant a new trial. Additionally, it was alleged that there was insufficient evidence to find Coonrod guilty of charges of involuntary manslaughter and child endangering in the deaths of his two young sons and that the court imposing maximum consecutive sentences was "arbitrary and capricious."
In January, Coonrod, 43, of Greenfield, was found guilty of two counts of involuntary manslaughter, felonies of the first degree, in the deaths of his sons Thomas, 4, and Stephen, 3, during a more-than-weeklong jury trial in Pickaway County Common Pleas Court. He was found not guilty on one count of aggravated arson.
In first assignment of error in the appeal, Coonrod states the "facts surrounding the dismissal of the juror" include that prior to deliberations on Monday, Jan. 31, 2011, juror number four sent a note to the court's attention. It stated, "We have a belligerent juror. I believe she has been in a similar situation as the defendant. She had a fire in her house and sent her son upstairs in a smoke-filled house. She is taking all discussions personal. I think we could reach a decision if she were replaced with one of the alternative jurors. Is that possible?'"
In the brief filed Monday in Pickaway County Common Pleas Court, Highland County Prosecutor Anneka Collins wrote that, "In his first assignment of error, (Coonrod) contends that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in dismissing juror number five. An abuse of discretion is 'more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.' Appellant incorrectly applies a capital murder standard to the case at bar. In fact, the state chose not to seek the death penalty in the second trial and voluntarily dismissed the death penalty specification from the indictment. The prior jury had no bearing on the death penalty specification as the prior case was hung on all counts except child endangerment. The trial court noted from the beginning that this case was not a death penalty case."
In October 2010, Coonrod had been found guilty on two counts of child endangering during a jury trial in Highland County Common Pleas Court. The jury was hung on two charges of murder, with death penalty specifications, and the charge of aggravated arson. The state did not seek the death penalty in the second trial. Highland County Common Pleas Court Judge Rocky Coss sentenced Coonrod to 10 years in prison on each involuntary manslaughter conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total of 20 years in prison.
Collins wrote, "In the case at bar, the trial court noted that 'I cannot remove a juror simply because they are not in agreement with the others...' However, the trial court noted that a juror can be removed if he or she cannot follow the law. The trial court went on to point out that the facts of juror number 5's life were very similar to the facts of the case she was sitting in judgment of ... Appellant goes to great lengths to point out that juror number 5 answered that she could deliberate fairly. However, the trial court was in the best position to see and hear the juror and note her body language and tone of voice. 'Deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.' Appellant fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in replacing juror number 5 with the first alternate. Further, Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the replacement prejudiced him in any way. If the defendant suffered no prejudice from the late substitution of an alternate juror, the error is harmless and the conviction stands. As there was no abuse of discretion and no prejudice to Appellant, this Court should overrule Appellant’s first assignment of error as being without merit."
In the second assignment of error, Coonrod alleged that the trial court erred when it allowed a state's witness, Joyce Krech, a nurse, "to testify as an expert to whether (Coonrod) was intoxicated" the night of the fire. Collins wrote that Krech did not offer expert testimony; rather, it was her "lay opinion based on her experiences with other intoxicated people."
Collins wrote that in Krech's testimony, she said that she smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Coonrod, and that at one point he became so enraged she was afraid of what he might do, and she asked for a police officer.
"Krech noted the smell of alcohol was strong: 'It was very, very strong. From a two-to-three foot being away, you could definitely smell it.' The trial court allowed Krech to testify that in her opinion, from dealing with other intoxicated people, Appellant was intoxicated. At no point did Krech give an expert opinion as to Appellant’s intoxication, only a lay opinion based on her experiences in dealing with intoxicated people. Additionally, the State did not ask Krech to be qualified as an expert or qualify her opinion as one of an expert ... Krech was giving her years of experience in dealing with intoxicated people to lay a foundation that (Coonrod) was intoxicated."
Additionally, Collins said that if the court of appeals should find that the trial court abused its discussion in allowed the testimony, there is other testimony regarding Coonrod's alleged intoxication and "There is no evidence the jury gave any more weight to Krech’s opinion that Appellant was intoxicated. There is further no evidence that (Coonrod) was prejudiced because of Krech’s statements that (Coonrod) was intoxicated."
In the third assignment of error in which Coonrod contends there is not enough evidence for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the state wrote that Coonrod "did nothing to prevent the death of his children.
"(Coonrod) would ask this Court to believe that he did everything he could to prevent his children from dying in the fire on March 7, 2010. While the State contends that (Coonrod) in fact set the fire, there is no disputing that (Coonrod) did nothing to prevent the death of his children. Appellant simply was not believed when he testified about his actions on March 7, 2010. The jury, doing as they are sworn to do, weighed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and believed that Appellant was intoxicated and did contribute to the fire and death of Thomas and Steven. While Appellant claims to be standing outside shocked, witnesses testified that Appellant was asking for a cigarette while his children screamed for help. Witnesses testified that (Coonrod) had a strong odor of alcohol on his person."
The state said that Coonrod admitted that he had been drinking on the night in question and that, "Additionally, Appellant gave at least three different versions of events of March 7, 2010. The jury believed, and the evidence demonstrated, that Appellant went out his front door and locked the door as he was leaving, with his house on fire and his children inside. (Coonrod) exited the house as soon as the fire began, locking the door behind him, and locking his children in. This is proven by the lack of soot on (Coonrod). The jury did not believe Appellant went out the back window of the house as the window was locked from the inside ... Based on the above, the evidence is overwhelming that Appellant committed the crime of Child Endangerment and in so doing, recklessly caused the death of Thomas and Steven Coonrod."
In the fourth assignment of error, in which it is alleged there was insufficient evidence for a conviction on child endangerment, the state wrote that Coonrod "recklessly created a substantial risk to the health and safety of Thomas and Steven Coonrod by violating a duty of care, protection or support and that violation resulted in Thomas and Steven dying. A person acts recklessly when with heedless indifference to the consequences he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or to be of a certain nature. Appellant acted recklessly when he locked the front door with the house on fire, leaving his children inside to die. Appellant was simply not believed when he testified that he crawled out the bedroom window. Appellant further acted recklessly when he refused to tell neighbors, firefighters, and paramedics where in the house the children could be found ... the evidence is overwhelming that Appellant committed the crime of Child Endangerment and in so doing, recklessly caused the death of Thomas and Stephen Coonrod."
In the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the court abused its discretion when Coonrod was sentenced to consecutive maximum sentences because "there is only so much you can do in regard to protecting your children. The trial court thought he should die to save his children. This is not what the law requires ... A tragedy occurred, and the two children lost their lives. However, a tragedy does not always equate with a crime. The trial court wants (Coonrod) to run into this building to save his children. There is nothing in the law that requires you to die with your children. It is certainly what every parent would want to do, take every step to save children in danger. A shocked, half-blind man watching a blaze take his children away cannot be expected to feel his way into the building and then somehow find his children."
Collins wrote that "Because trial courts have the discretion to sentence defendants within the statutory framework, this assignment of error must be denied. Additionally, the trial court specifically looked at the felony sentencing principles."
She then quoted statements Coss made to Coonrod during the sentencing:
"This case has been all about you. You and how you’re suffering because your children died," Coss said to Coonrod. "Yet I’ve heard nothing about your children screaming during that fire. The emotion you showed in the first trial, and the second trial in this case is much greater than the first trial. It didn’t seem to me, as I watched that, listening to the testimony of those witnesses who talked about your children screaming while the fire was raging, evoked any emotion from you ... And the fact is that the evidence and the verdicts of the jury, both juries, have said you are responsible, you failed in your duty to protect your children ... You could testify very positively to the things you claim you did, and yet when it came to the things that everybody else said you did, well, it was like a dream and I really couldn’t tell, this and that. So, the Court will proceed to sentencing ... The Court finds that based upon the circumstances, based upon the evidence in both trials, the findings of the jury in both trials, the Court finds that this is the worst form of the offense of the two young boys having died in this fire."
"(Coonrod) would ask this Court to believe the trial court based the sentence on Appellant’s trial testimony," Collins wrote. "However, the trial court noted several times it considered all the evidence adduced in both trials. The trial court noted that there was no question this fire was intentionally set. Trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range. As the sentences imposed were within the statutory range and the trial court considered the principals of felony sentencing, there was no abuse of discretion."
In conclusion, the prosecutor said that sentence and judgment of the jury should be upheld.
"The trial court committed no abuse of discretion in seating an alternate juror or in allowing Joyce Krech to give a lay witness opinion. Additionally, the evidence was overwhelming that Appellant committed the crime of Child Endangerment resulting in the death of his two young sons; therefore Appellant was properly convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter," Collins wrote. "Finally, Appellant was drinking on the night in question and locked his two young children in a burning house. Twenty years in prison for this crime is neither arbitrary nor capricious. As such, this Court should overrule Appellant’s brief in its entirety and uphold the judgment of the jury and the sentence of the trial court."
The Highland County Prosecutor's Office filed a brief with Ohio's Fourth District Court of Appeals on Monday stating that Wesley Coonrod does not deserve a third trial because the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed a juror during deliberations and seated an alternate.
In August, Coonrod's attorney, Eric Allen, filed an appeal of his convictions of involuntary manslaughter, saying that the trial court erred in its dismissal of a "holdout" juror "without just cause" and requested that the court of appeals grant a new trial. Additionally, it was alleged that there was insufficient evidence to find Coonrod guilty of charges of involuntary manslaughter and child endangering in the deaths of his two young sons and that the court imposing maximum consecutive sentences was "arbitrary and capricious."
In January, Coonrod, 43, of Greenfield, was found guilty of two counts of involuntary manslaughter, felonies of the first degree, in the deaths of his sons Thomas, 4, and Stephen, 3, during a more-than-weeklong jury trial in Pickaway County Common Pleas Court. He was found not guilty on one count of aggravated arson.
In first assignment of error in the appeal, Coonrod states the "facts surrounding the dismissal of the juror" include that prior to deliberations on Monday, Jan. 31, 2011, juror number four sent a note to the court's attention. It stated, "We have a belligerent juror. I believe she has been in a similar situation as the defendant. She had a fire in her house and sent her son upstairs in a smoke-filled house. She is taking all discussions personal. I think we could reach a decision if she were replaced with one of the alternative jurors. Is that possible?'"
In the brief filed Monday in Pickaway County Common Pleas Court, Highland County Prosecutor Anneka Collins wrote that, "In his first assignment of error, (Coonrod) contends that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion in dismissing juror number five. An abuse of discretion is 'more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.' Appellant incorrectly applies a capital murder standard to the case at bar. In fact, the state chose not to seek the death penalty in the second trial and voluntarily dismissed the death penalty specification from the indictment. The prior jury had no bearing on the death penalty specification as the prior case was hung on all counts except child endangerment. The trial court noted from the beginning that this case was not a death penalty case."
In October 2010, Coonrod had been found guilty on two counts of child endangering during a jury trial in Highland County Common Pleas Court. The jury was hung on two charges of murder, with death penalty specifications, and the charge of aggravated arson. The state did not seek the death penalty in the second trial. Highland County Common Pleas Court Judge Rocky Coss sentenced Coonrod to 10 years in prison on each involuntary manslaughter conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total of 20 years in prison.
Collins wrote, "In the case at bar, the trial court noted that 'I cannot remove a juror simply because they are not in agreement with the others...' However, the trial court noted that a juror can be removed if he or she cannot follow the law. The trial court went on to point out that the facts of juror number 5's life were very similar to the facts of the case she was sitting in judgment of ... Appellant goes to great lengths to point out that juror number 5 answered that she could deliberate fairly. However, the trial court was in the best position to see and hear the juror and note her body language and tone of voice. 'Deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.' Appellant fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in replacing juror number 5 with the first alternate. Further, Appellant has failed to demonstrate how the replacement prejudiced him in any way. If the defendant suffered no prejudice from the late substitution of an alternate juror, the error is harmless and the conviction stands. As there was no abuse of discretion and no prejudice to Appellant, this Court should overrule Appellant’s first assignment of error as being without merit."
In the second assignment of error, Coonrod alleged that the trial court erred when it allowed a state's witness, Joyce Krech, a nurse, "to testify as an expert to whether (Coonrod) was intoxicated" the night of the fire. Collins wrote that Krech did not offer expert testimony; rather, it was her "lay opinion based on her experiences with other intoxicated people."
Collins wrote that in Krech's testimony, she said that she smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Coonrod, and that at one point he became so enraged she was afraid of what he might do, and she asked for a police officer.
"Krech noted the smell of alcohol was strong: 'It was very, very strong. From a two-to-three foot being away, you could definitely smell it.' The trial court allowed Krech to testify that in her opinion, from dealing with other intoxicated people, Appellant was intoxicated. At no point did Krech give an expert opinion as to Appellant’s intoxication, only a lay opinion based on her experiences in dealing with intoxicated people. Additionally, the State did not ask Krech to be qualified as an expert or qualify her opinion as one of an expert ... Krech was giving her years of experience in dealing with intoxicated people to lay a foundation that (Coonrod) was intoxicated."
Additionally, Collins said that if the court of appeals should find that the trial court abused its discussion in allowed the testimony, there is other testimony regarding Coonrod's alleged intoxication and "There is no evidence the jury gave any more weight to Krech’s opinion that Appellant was intoxicated. There is further no evidence that (Coonrod) was prejudiced because of Krech’s statements that (Coonrod) was intoxicated."
In the third assignment of error in which Coonrod contends there is not enough evidence for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, the state wrote that Coonrod "did nothing to prevent the death of his children.
"(Coonrod) would ask this Court to believe that he did everything he could to prevent his children from dying in the fire on March 7, 2010. While the State contends that (Coonrod) in fact set the fire, there is no disputing that (Coonrod) did nothing to prevent the death of his children. Appellant simply was not believed when he testified about his actions on March 7, 2010. The jury, doing as they are sworn to do, weighed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and believed that Appellant was intoxicated and did contribute to the fire and death of Thomas and Steven. While Appellant claims to be standing outside shocked, witnesses testified that Appellant was asking for a cigarette while his children screamed for help. Witnesses testified that (Coonrod) had a strong odor of alcohol on his person."
The state said that Coonrod admitted that he had been drinking on the night in question and that, "Additionally, Appellant gave at least three different versions of events of March 7, 2010. The jury believed, and the evidence demonstrated, that Appellant went out his front door and locked the door as he was leaving, with his house on fire and his children inside. (Coonrod) exited the house as soon as the fire began, locking the door behind him, and locking his children in. This is proven by the lack of soot on (Coonrod). The jury did not believe Appellant went out the back window of the house as the window was locked from the inside ... Based on the above, the evidence is overwhelming that Appellant committed the crime of Child Endangerment and in so doing, recklessly caused the death of Thomas and Steven Coonrod."
In the fourth assignment of error, in which it is alleged there was insufficient evidence for a conviction on child endangerment, the state wrote that Coonrod "recklessly created a substantial risk to the health and safety of Thomas and Steven Coonrod by violating a duty of care, protection or support and that violation resulted in Thomas and Steven dying. A person acts recklessly when with heedless indifference to the consequences he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or to be of a certain nature. Appellant acted recklessly when he locked the front door with the house on fire, leaving his children inside to die. Appellant was simply not believed when he testified that he crawled out the bedroom window. Appellant further acted recklessly when he refused to tell neighbors, firefighters, and paramedics where in the house the children could be found ... the evidence is overwhelming that Appellant committed the crime of Child Endangerment and in so doing, recklessly caused the death of Thomas and Stephen Coonrod."
In the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the court abused its discretion when Coonrod was sentenced to consecutive maximum sentences because "there is only so much you can do in regard to protecting your children. The trial court thought he should die to save his children. This is not what the law requires ... A tragedy occurred, and the two children lost their lives. However, a tragedy does not always equate with a crime. The trial court wants (Coonrod) to run into this building to save his children. There is nothing in the law that requires you to die with your children. It is certainly what every parent would want to do, take every step to save children in danger. A shocked, half-blind man watching a blaze take his children away cannot be expected to feel his way into the building and then somehow find his children."
Collins wrote that "Because trial courts have the discretion to sentence defendants within the statutory framework, this assignment of error must be denied. Additionally, the trial court specifically looked at the felony sentencing principles."
She then quoted statements Coss made to Coonrod during the sentencing:
"This case has been all about you. You and how you’re suffering because your children died," Coss said to Coonrod. "Yet I’ve heard nothing about your children screaming during that fire. The emotion you showed in the first trial, and the second trial in this case is much greater than the first trial. It didn’t seem to me, as I watched that, listening to the testimony of those witnesses who talked about your children screaming while the fire was raging, evoked any emotion from you ... And the fact is that the evidence and the verdicts of the jury, both juries, have said you are responsible, you failed in your duty to protect your children ... You could testify very positively to the things you claim you did, and yet when it came to the things that everybody else said you did, well, it was like a dream and I really couldn’t tell, this and that. So, the Court will proceed to sentencing ... The Court finds that based upon the circumstances, based upon the evidence in both trials, the findings of the jury in both trials, the Court finds that this is the worst form of the offense of the two young boys having died in this fire."
"(Coonrod) would ask this Court to believe the trial court based the sentence on Appellant’s trial testimony," Collins wrote. "However, the trial court noted several times it considered all the evidence adduced in both trials. The trial court noted that there was no question this fire was intentionally set. Trial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the statutory range. As the sentences imposed were within the statutory range and the trial court considered the principals of felony sentencing, there was no abuse of discretion."
In conclusion, the prosecutor said that sentence and judgment of the jury should be upheld.
"The trial court committed no abuse of discretion in seating an alternate juror or in allowing Joyce Krech to give a lay witness opinion. Additionally, the evidence was overwhelming that Appellant committed the crime of Child Endangerment resulting in the death of his two young sons; therefore Appellant was properly convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter," Collins wrote. "Finally, Appellant was drinking on the night in question and locked his two young children in a burning house. Twenty years in prison for this crime is neither arbitrary nor capricious. As such, this Court should overrule Appellant’s brief in its entirety and uphold the judgment of the jury and the sentence of the trial court."
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