Appeals court upholds vehicular homicide conviction

Ohio's Fourth District Court of Appeals has upheld the convictions of an area man convicted of vehicular homicide and vehicular assault. 

According to the decision published online Dec. 23, the court considered the appeal of Jeremy D. Lansing. 

According to the appeal, "On the evening of March 24, 2008, (Lansing), along with two passengers, drove eastbound on Sinking Spring Road when his car left the roadway, went into a ditch and eventually landed in a wheat field some 55 feet from the road. Elizabeth Theophilos was killed in the crash. Appellant and Tara Cruea also suffered serious injuries. (A) Highland County grand jury returned separate indictments that charged Lansing with aggravated vehicular assault and aggravated vehicular homicide. At the jury trial in July 2009, the pivotal issue was appellant’s speed at the time of the accident. Trooper Jeremy Grillot, an Ohio Highway Patrol 'traffic crash reconstructionist,' recounted his investigation of the accident and opined that appellant’s vehicle travelled slightly in excess of ninety miles per hour (90 mph) at the time it left the road."

According to the court, a defense expert testified the vehicle was traveling between 58-64 mph at the time of the incident.

The jury found Lansing guilty on both counts, and the court sentenced him to serve 18 months in prison for aggravated vehicular assault, and five years for aggravated vehicular homicide, to be served consecutively.

The state was represented by the Highland County Prosecutor's Office. 

Lansing was represented by attorney Michael P. Kelly, and submitted four assignments of error to the court of appeals: The trial court erred in sentencing Lansing to consecutive maximum terms of imprisonment; the trial court erred in finding that Lansing had acted recklessly and its verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence; the prosecution committed misconduct when in his closing arguments he improperly denigrated the defense expert and told the jury the defense expert witness was not being truthful; Lansing was deprived of a fair trial due to ineffective assistance.

In the decision, the court considered the second assignment of error first, stating that "Appellant correctly points out that the expert witnesses offered conflicting testimony concerning appellant's vehicle's speed at the time of the accident. Such conflicts in the evidence do not, however, necessarily warrant a reversal. Although it is unclear which expert the jury may have found more credible, we believe that the evidence adduced in this matter is such that the jury could have found that appellant acted recklessly under either scenario. Obviously, Trooper Grillot's expert opinion that appellant drove in excess of ninety miles per hour (90 mph) at the time of the accident is damaging. 

"The jury may well have found that evidence to be the most credible. However, even if the jury accepted appellant’s expert's testimony, it could nevertheless have found that appellant acted recklessly under the circumstances present in this case. By his own admission, appellant stated that he typically drove between 45-50 mph on Sinking Spring Road. At trial, however, appellant’s expert estimated that appellant was driving at least (58-64 mph that evening. The evidence further indicates that the accident occurred after dark and with no lights to illuminate the road.  Authority does exist for the proposition that excessive speed. Considering all of these factors, we conclude in the case sub judice that ample competent, credible evidence was adduced at trial to establish that appellant acted recklessly and the verdicts are not against the manifest weight of the evidence." The court overruled the second assignment of error. 

Regarding the third and fourth assignments of error, the court considered a statement made by the prosecution during closing arguments which included, “'Now that was another thing, and I understand this, I mean, you know the defendants buy experts to give their testimony at trial to try to get themselves off and all this business, that they are not going to play really well with the truth, I’m sorry, with the prosecutor and things like that ... 'Appellant asserts that the assistant prosecutor's statement, that questioned appellant's expert witness's veracity, constitutes reversible prosecutorial misconduct and warrants a reversal of judgment of conviction. Appellant also correctly notes that trial counsel did not object to the comment and, consequently, waived all but

plain error. Consequently, appellant contends that trial counsel's failure to timely object constitutes constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. After our review of this matter, we conclude that even if the comment is improper and extends beyond the boundary of legitimate argument, appellant's convictions cannot be reversed unless the comment rises to the level of plain error ... After our review in the case sub judice, we do not believe that the trial's outcome would have been otherwise but for the assistant prosecutor’s closing argument comment." The court overruled the third and fourth assignments of error. 

Regarding sentencing, the appeals court stated that a review of the "case reveals that the trial court provided a detailed explanation for its decision and cited several factors: (1) the speed that appellant drove his vehicle, (2) the fact that appellant bragged to others about his speed, and (3) the absence of any 'true remorse' during his testimony. The trial judge also explicitly noted that in a career spanning 33 years, during which he has been involved in many vehicular homicide cases, he found this case to be 'one of the worst forms of the offense.' There is no dispute that this incident is a sad and tragic matter. As a result of appellant's reckless actions and poor decision-making, a young passenger needlessly lost her life and another young passenger suffered serious bodily injury ... In view of the particular facts and circumstances of this case, and considering the trial court's thoughtful deliberation before it imposed sentence, we cannot conclude that the court's decision to impose consecutive sentences is arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in this regard. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons we hereby overrule appellant's first assignment of error and affirm the trial court's judgment."

Judge Peter B. Abele submitted the opinion and Judge Matthew McFarland concurred in judgment and opinion. Judge William Harsha concurred in judgment and opinion with a concurring opinion, which stated, "Although I concur in judgment and opinion concerning the second assignment of error, had the appellant preserved the issue of prosecutorial misconduct for review under a less rigorous standard than plain error, I would have found prejudicial error."