Highland County prosecutor argues two cases before Ohio Supreme Court
Lead Summary
By
Caitlin Forsha-crforsha@gmail.com
Highland County Prosecutor Anneka Collins argued two cases before the Ohio Supreme Court Tuesday in the Moyer Judicial Center in Columbus.
This was the first time Collins has argued before the Supreme Court.
"It was amazing," Collins said. "Most people don't even get this opportunity. It's an honor.
"This was my first time, and I went for two cases at once."
Collins said that she was told that people in the Highland County Prosecutor's Office, along with several other county offices, watched her arguments via live webcast on the Supreme Court's website.
Collins represented the state in two cases, the State of Ohio v. Jeffrey Stevens and the State of Ohio v. Zachary Bondurant.
As previously reported in The Highland County Press, Collins argued on behalf of the state at both the trial court and appellate levels.
"It was a benefit to me to have worked on this case from start to finish," Collins said. "I was able to answer all of their questions."
In August 2011, Stevens and Bondurant were tried in a joint case in Highland County Common Pleas Court. The state had alleged that from October 2010 through March 2010, Bondurant and Stevens were part of a drug ring that trafficked heroin and cocaine that had been brought from the Dayton area into Highland County. The state said that Rodger Cassell was the leader of the drug enterprise, and he provided the drugs that were reportedly trafficked.
Stevens, of Wilmington, was sentenced to 13 years in prison after being found guilty of 17 counts against him, including engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, trafficking in drugs and possession of drugs. Bondurant, of Bainbridge, was sentenced to 11 years in prison and was found guilty of 13 counts, including engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, trafficking in drugs, trafficking drugs in a school zone and possession of drugs.
Bondurant's counsel filed an appeal in January 2012. In Bondurant's appeal, attorney Eric Allen alleged three assignments of error: the state failed to offer sufficient evidence to convict Bondurant of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, thus violating his right to due process; the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence that the alleged drug activity occurred within the vicinity of a school; and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel after trial counsel failed to move that the trial court for an order to sever his trial from his co-defendant.
In Stevens' appeal, filed in December 2011, attorney Bryan Scott Hicks alleged three assignments of error: The trial court improperly interpreted the law when it aggregated the values of of the contraband of all the defendants in meeting the $500 threshold for the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activities charge; "the trial court improperly convicted of a first degree felony"; and the sentence on engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was improperly mandatory.
Collins argued her position before the Fourth Appellate District Court of Ohio on April 26, 2012. The main issue on appeal was regarding the statutory requirement that proceeds from the criminal activity exceeded $500. The defendants argued that the $500 threshold applied to each of them individually. At trial, evidence indicated that over $35,000 was recovered from the search of a co-defendant's property. The District Court held that due to the enterprise as a whole profiting more than $35,000, the $500 threshold had been met. Essentially, each defendant that participated in the enterprise was responsible for the actions of the entire enterprise.
The decision of the Appellate Court emphasized the accountability of everyone involved in organized crime under the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity statute. It allowed the State to prosecute even the smallest participant for the actions of the enterprise.
The question presented to the Ohio Supreme Court was, "In Ohio's RICO [Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations] Statute, do the profits required for corrupt activity apply to the profits made by the enterprise as a whole or the profits made per individual?"
The issues were: "Does the definition of 'corrupt activity' in statute require reaching a monetary threshold of illegal activity for an individual or for the enterprise as a group? When sentencing an individual for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, do 'predicate' acts used to determine what degree a felony is included in the acts of other defendants in the enterprise?
Stevens was represented by Hicks during the hearing.
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According to the Ohio Supreme Court's website, "Attorneys for Stevens argue that R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is ambiguous about whether the threshold amount defined as corrupt activity is determined by calculating the combined value of an individual’s illicit activities or the aggregated value of the enterprise’s, or group’s, illicit activities.
"They note that the trial court said there is no case law on point with this issue and add there are reasonable arguments for either interpretation of the statute. They assert it makes sense for the law to mean that 'for an individual’s criminal conduct to merit a separate punishment as part of a group, then that individual’s own conduct must rise to a threshold amount.'
"Regardless of interpretation, they argue that Ohio law and the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in U.S. v. Santos (2008) require courts to interpret unclear criminal statutes in the favor of the accused."
Bondurant was represented by Eryn Kelly Mihocik.
The Ohio Supreme Court's website states, "Bondurant’s attorneys argue that the Ohio RICO statutes are clear. R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) states, 'No person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of unlawful debt.'
"Bondurant’s attorneys assert that the plain language of the statute states that a person must commit the corrupt activity, and none of the words indicate that codefendants’ actions should be considered collectively when determining if a person has engaged in corrupt activity. They add that it follows that the related RICO statutes cannot be read as allowing violations of more than one individual to be combined.
"They also argue that the appeals court decision allows a person to be prosecuted for a pattern of corrupt activity just by associating with another person engaged in a criminal activity. That ruling, they assert, makes it unclear when a person’s actions causes him or her to be liable for someone else’s corrupt activities – which they say is constitutionally doubtful. They argue that the state is asking the Supreme Court to make individuals associated with a criminal enterprise responsible for the acts of the others involved without requiring that they personally conduct or participate in the acts.
"Citing the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Schlosser (1991), they assert that the state can’t aggregate the amounts 'performed’ by two participants in an enterprise to reach the threshold amount."
On behalf of the state, Collins' argument was that "the Ohio RICO statute is designed to prohibit group, not individual, conduct, so the state only needs to show that the enterprise as a whole profited more than $500," said the Ohio Supreme Court's website. "They state: 'The purpose of the statute is to capture even the smallest fish involved in the enterprise, therefore the value of violations by the enterprise should be aggregated.' They add that, to hold otherwise, would let individuals escape punishment because they weren’t personally involved in a transaction of more than $500 even though the enterprise profited significantly. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Salinas v. United States (1997), the state’s attorneys argue that Stevens and Bondurant were complicit with the ringleader Cassell in obtaining more than $30,000 in profit so they are liable as conspirators even if they didn’t commit the acts themselves."
Collins told the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court that the case is "a case of first impression."
"Has any other state dealt with this same issue of the individual responsibility within the organization?" Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger asked.
"Only with relation to property crimes," Collins said. "This is truly a case of first impression in that it relates to drug crimes. The only cases that address the monetary amounts that we were able to find, even at the trial court level when this was initially argued, had to do with property crimes.
Justice Paul Pfeifer told Collins, "We have to do what we always do, and that is look at the statute and figure out what's the right answer to a question that quite probably the General Assembly never anticipated."
Collins said that she was not given any indication on when an opinion will be issued.
(Brandy Chandler contributed to this article.)
This was the first time Collins has argued before the Supreme Court.
"It was amazing," Collins said. "Most people don't even get this opportunity. It's an honor.
"This was my first time, and I went for two cases at once."
Collins said that she was told that people in the Highland County Prosecutor's Office, along with several other county offices, watched her arguments via live webcast on the Supreme Court's website.
Collins represented the state in two cases, the State of Ohio v. Jeffrey Stevens and the State of Ohio v. Zachary Bondurant.
As previously reported in The Highland County Press, Collins argued on behalf of the state at both the trial court and appellate levels.
"It was a benefit to me to have worked on this case from start to finish," Collins said. "I was able to answer all of their questions."
In August 2011, Stevens and Bondurant were tried in a joint case in Highland County Common Pleas Court. The state had alleged that from October 2010 through March 2010, Bondurant and Stevens were part of a drug ring that trafficked heroin and cocaine that had been brought from the Dayton area into Highland County. The state said that Rodger Cassell was the leader of the drug enterprise, and he provided the drugs that were reportedly trafficked.
Stevens, of Wilmington, was sentenced to 13 years in prison after being found guilty of 17 counts against him, including engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, trafficking in drugs and possession of drugs. Bondurant, of Bainbridge, was sentenced to 11 years in prison and was found guilty of 13 counts, including engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, trafficking in drugs, trafficking drugs in a school zone and possession of drugs.
Bondurant's counsel filed an appeal in January 2012. In Bondurant's appeal, attorney Eric Allen alleged three assignments of error: the state failed to offer sufficient evidence to convict Bondurant of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, thus violating his right to due process; the conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence that the alleged drug activity occurred within the vicinity of a school; and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel after trial counsel failed to move that the trial court for an order to sever his trial from his co-defendant.
In Stevens' appeal, filed in December 2011, attorney Bryan Scott Hicks alleged three assignments of error: The trial court improperly interpreted the law when it aggregated the values of of the contraband of all the defendants in meeting the $500 threshold for the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activities charge; "the trial court improperly convicted of a first degree felony"; and the sentence on engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was improperly mandatory.
Collins argued her position before the Fourth Appellate District Court of Ohio on April 26, 2012. The main issue on appeal was regarding the statutory requirement that proceeds from the criminal activity exceeded $500. The defendants argued that the $500 threshold applied to each of them individually. At trial, evidence indicated that over $35,000 was recovered from the search of a co-defendant's property. The District Court held that due to the enterprise as a whole profiting more than $35,000, the $500 threshold had been met. Essentially, each defendant that participated in the enterprise was responsible for the actions of the entire enterprise.
The decision of the Appellate Court emphasized the accountability of everyone involved in organized crime under the engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity statute. It allowed the State to prosecute even the smallest participant for the actions of the enterprise.
The question presented to the Ohio Supreme Court was, "In Ohio's RICO [Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations] Statute, do the profits required for corrupt activity apply to the profits made by the enterprise as a whole or the profits made per individual?"
The issues were: "Does the definition of 'corrupt activity' in statute require reaching a monetary threshold of illegal activity for an individual or for the enterprise as a group? When sentencing an individual for engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, do 'predicate' acts used to determine what degree a felony is included in the acts of other defendants in the enterprise?
Stevens was represented by Hicks during the hearing.
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According to the Ohio Supreme Court's website, "Attorneys for Stevens argue that R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) is ambiguous about whether the threshold amount defined as corrupt activity is determined by calculating the combined value of an individual’s illicit activities or the aggregated value of the enterprise’s, or group’s, illicit activities.
"They note that the trial court said there is no case law on point with this issue and add there are reasonable arguments for either interpretation of the statute. They assert it makes sense for the law to mean that 'for an individual’s criminal conduct to merit a separate punishment as part of a group, then that individual’s own conduct must rise to a threshold amount.'
"Regardless of interpretation, they argue that Ohio law and the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in U.S. v. Santos (2008) require courts to interpret unclear criminal statutes in the favor of the accused."
Bondurant was represented by Eryn Kelly Mihocik.
The Ohio Supreme Court's website states, "Bondurant’s attorneys argue that the Ohio RICO statutes are clear. R.C. 2923.32(A)(1) states, 'No person employed by, or associated with, any enterprise shall conduct or participate in, directly or indirectly, the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of corrupt activity or the collection of unlawful debt.'
"Bondurant’s attorneys assert that the plain language of the statute states that a person must commit the corrupt activity, and none of the words indicate that codefendants’ actions should be considered collectively when determining if a person has engaged in corrupt activity. They add that it follows that the related RICO statutes cannot be read as allowing violations of more than one individual to be combined.
"They also argue that the appeals court decision allows a person to be prosecuted for a pattern of corrupt activity just by associating with another person engaged in a criminal activity. That ruling, they assert, makes it unclear when a person’s actions causes him or her to be liable for someone else’s corrupt activities – which they say is constitutionally doubtful. They argue that the state is asking the Supreme Court to make individuals associated with a criminal enterprise responsible for the acts of the others involved without requiring that they personally conduct or participate in the acts.
"Citing the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Schlosser (1991), they assert that the state can’t aggregate the amounts 'performed’ by two participants in an enterprise to reach the threshold amount."
On behalf of the state, Collins' argument was that "the Ohio RICO statute is designed to prohibit group, not individual, conduct, so the state only needs to show that the enterprise as a whole profited more than $500," said the Ohio Supreme Court's website. "They state: 'The purpose of the statute is to capture even the smallest fish involved in the enterprise, therefore the value of violations by the enterprise should be aggregated.' They add that, to hold otherwise, would let individuals escape punishment because they weren’t personally involved in a transaction of more than $500 even though the enterprise profited significantly. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court in Salinas v. United States (1997), the state’s attorneys argue that Stevens and Bondurant were complicit with the ringleader Cassell in obtaining more than $30,000 in profit so they are liable as conspirators even if they didn’t commit the acts themselves."
Collins told the justices of the Ohio Supreme Court that the case is "a case of first impression."
"Has any other state dealt with this same issue of the individual responsibility within the organization?" Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger asked.
"Only with relation to property crimes," Collins said. "This is truly a case of first impression in that it relates to drug crimes. The only cases that address the monetary amounts that we were able to find, even at the trial court level when this was initially argued, had to do with property crimes.
Justice Paul Pfeifer told Collins, "We have to do what we always do, and that is look at the statute and figure out what's the right answer to a question that quite probably the General Assembly never anticipated."
Collins said that she was not given any indication on when an opinion will be issued.
(Brandy Chandler contributed to this article.)