Appeals court reverses decision of Highland County Common Pleas Court
By
Brandy Chandler-brandychandler@gmail.com
The Fourth District Court of Appeals has reversed a decision from Highland County Common Pleas Court regarding a defendant refusing his right to counsel during a court hearing that ultimately led to having his judicial release revoked.
According to court documents posted Sept. 30, Dennis Mootispaw appealed the order that the court found him guilty of supervision violations, revoked his judicial release and sent him back to serve the remainder of his original prison sentence.
During the appeal, the state was represented by the Highland County Prosecutor's Office and Mootispaw was represented by Carol Ann Curren.
"After Mootispaw served a year of a three-year sentence for felonious assault, the court granted his petition for judicial release," according to the courts judgment entry. Several months later, the Adult Parole Authority alleged that he violated three terms of judicial. After Mootispaw appeared pro se (represented himself) at the hearing on the supervision violations and admitted to two of them, the court reinstated his prison sentence.
In the appeal, Mootispaw alleged that he "did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to counsel" during the hearing. The court agreed with that assertion.
Mootispaw appeared before the court on allegations from the APA that he had been convicted of disorderly conduct in Fayette County, possessed ammunition and a magazine for a handgun and that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage. The appeal indicated that Mootispaw spoke with his supervising officer Shari Barton regarding the alleged violations, and she indicated that rather than being sent back to prison he could qualify for the STAR program.
The defendant "twice declined counsel," according to the entry. He then admitted to the court that he been convicted of disorderly conduct and that he had consumed alcohol. The state dismissed the allegation relating to the ammunition, "which also lends support to the conclusion that there had been negotiations between Mootispaw and the state."
"Before sentencing commenced, Mootispaw explained to the court that he was an alcoholic and had liver disease, needed medical attention for alcoholism and that prison was not helping him," according to the decision.
During the hearing, according to the entry, Barton explained that the STAR program is a lock-down treatment facility and that she was not sure STAR would accept him "in light of his medical condition."
Mootispaw alleged three assignments of error in the appeal: that the waiver of counsel was not done knowingly or voluntarily; that the trial court erred by not informing him of the possible dangers of self-representation; and that Mootispaw's admission to his probation violations was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
According to the appeals court's decision, Mootispaw believed that the hearing was "simply a formality to get him into the STAR program."
The court, according to the entry, informed Mootispaw, "You could go back, if any of these violations are found to be true, to prison for two years ... You have a right to have an attorney to represent you throughout this process. You also have a right to hire your own, if you would like to do that. So the first question I want to ask is if you have any questions of the court as to why you're here today ... Secondly, would you like to hire an attorney to represent you in this matter, and/or would you like the court to appoint one to help you through the case?"
In response to both questions, Mootispaw said, "no." The court gave him a moment to think about it and he said, "I've spoke with Ms. Barton and I believe I'm ready to proceed." He also signed a form waiving his right to counsel.
The court of appeals found, "Based upon our review of that dialogue and the strong presumption against waiver, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances indicate that the court did not obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of Mootispaw's right to counsel. The court did inform Mootispaw of the nature of the supervision violations and the possible penalties it could impose, i.e., his original prison term. And the court did have Mootispaw sign a written waiver form. However, the court did not inform Mootispaw of the dangers inherent in self-representation, the disadvantages to representing oneself, or any possible defenses to the charges."
The state alleged that Mootispaw understood the nature of refusing counsel because he had successfully previously argued to have a judge recuse himself on his case and he had an extensive criminal history that "'spanned nearly 25 pages,' indicating he had some awareness of the value of a professionally trained advocate and could intelligently waive that assistance." Additionally, the state argued that even if Mootispaw had legal representation, the court could still have sentenced him to serve the remainder of his prison term.
The court of appeals concluded that "the totality of circumstances indicate that the court did not obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. There was no warning concerning the dangers of self-representation. Nor do we find any discussion of possible defenses to the allegations. And at a minimum, Mootispaw's comment that he was 'ready to proceed' pro se because of a conversation with Barton required the court to make further inquiries about Mootispaw's rationale for waiving counsel on that basis and to assure that he fully understood the potential ramifications of such a decision. Included in that dialogue should be an express warning that the court is not bound by any recommendations resulting from negotiations between the accused and the state.
"Having sustained Mootispaw's first and second assignments of error, we reverse the order of the trial court, vacate Mootispaw's pleas and remand this action for proceedings consistent with this opinion."
The Fourth District Court of Appeals has reversed a decision from Highland County Common Pleas Court regarding a defendant refusing his right to counsel during a court hearing that ultimately led to having his judicial release revoked.
According to court documents posted Sept. 30, Dennis Mootispaw appealed the order that the court found him guilty of supervision violations, revoked his judicial release and sent him back to serve the remainder of his original prison sentence.
During the appeal, the state was represented by the Highland County Prosecutor's Office and Mootispaw was represented by Carol Ann Curren.
"After Mootispaw served a year of a three-year sentence for felonious assault, the court granted his petition for judicial release," according to the courts judgment entry. Several months later, the Adult Parole Authority alleged that he violated three terms of judicial. After Mootispaw appeared pro se (represented himself) at the hearing on the supervision violations and admitted to two of them, the court reinstated his prison sentence.
In the appeal, Mootispaw alleged that he "did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to counsel" during the hearing. The court agreed with that assertion.
Mootispaw appeared before the court on allegations from the APA that he had been convicted of disorderly conduct in Fayette County, possessed ammunition and a magazine for a handgun and that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage. The appeal indicated that Mootispaw spoke with his supervising officer Shari Barton regarding the alleged violations, and she indicated that rather than being sent back to prison he could qualify for the STAR program.
The defendant "twice declined counsel," according to the entry. He then admitted to the court that he been convicted of disorderly conduct and that he had consumed alcohol. The state dismissed the allegation relating to the ammunition, "which also lends support to the conclusion that there had been negotiations between Mootispaw and the state."
"Before sentencing commenced, Mootispaw explained to the court that he was an alcoholic and had liver disease, needed medical attention for alcoholism and that prison was not helping him," according to the decision.
During the hearing, according to the entry, Barton explained that the STAR program is a lock-down treatment facility and that she was not sure STAR would accept him "in light of his medical condition."
Mootispaw alleged three assignments of error in the appeal: that the waiver of counsel was not done knowingly or voluntarily; that the trial court erred by not informing him of the possible dangers of self-representation; and that Mootispaw's admission to his probation violations was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
According to the appeals court's decision, Mootispaw believed that the hearing was "simply a formality to get him into the STAR program."
The court, according to the entry, informed Mootispaw, "You could go back, if any of these violations are found to be true, to prison for two years ... You have a right to have an attorney to represent you throughout this process. You also have a right to hire your own, if you would like to do that. So the first question I want to ask is if you have any questions of the court as to why you're here today ... Secondly, would you like to hire an attorney to represent you in this matter, and/or would you like the court to appoint one to help you through the case?"
In response to both questions, Mootispaw said, "no." The court gave him a moment to think about it and he said, "I've spoke with Ms. Barton and I believe I'm ready to proceed." He also signed a form waiving his right to counsel.
The court of appeals found, "Based upon our review of that dialogue and the strong presumption against waiver, we conclude that the totality of the circumstances indicate that the court did not obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of Mootispaw's right to counsel. The court did inform Mootispaw of the nature of the supervision violations and the possible penalties it could impose, i.e., his original prison term. And the court did have Mootispaw sign a written waiver form. However, the court did not inform Mootispaw of the dangers inherent in self-representation, the disadvantages to representing oneself, or any possible defenses to the charges."
The state alleged that Mootispaw understood the nature of refusing counsel because he had successfully previously argued to have a judge recuse himself on his case and he had an extensive criminal history that "'spanned nearly 25 pages,' indicating he had some awareness of the value of a professionally trained advocate and could intelligently waive that assistance." Additionally, the state argued that even if Mootispaw had legal representation, the court could still have sentenced him to serve the remainder of his prison term.
The court of appeals concluded that "the totality of circumstances indicate that the court did not obtain a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver. There was no warning concerning the dangers of self-representation. Nor do we find any discussion of possible defenses to the allegations. And at a minimum, Mootispaw's comment that he was 'ready to proceed' pro se because of a conversation with Barton required the court to make further inquiries about Mootispaw's rationale for waiving counsel on that basis and to assure that he fully understood the potential ramifications of such a decision. Included in that dialogue should be an express warning that the court is not bound by any recommendations resulting from negotiations between the accused and the state.
"Having sustained Mootispaw's first and second assignments of error, we reverse the order of the trial court, vacate Mootispaw's pleas and remand this action for proceedings consistent with this opinion."
[[In-content Ad]]